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I. Introduction
A persistent theme in the campaign for the California Civil
Rights Initiative1 has been its claim of moral superiority. CCRI advo-
* Copyright, Neil Gotanda, 1996.
** Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, Fullerton. Thanks to
Erwin Chemerinsky and David Oppenheimer for their example and support. Special
thanks to the members of the Western State University CCRI research project: Jamila
Bayati, Susan Berkman, Cherisse Lanier, Heather McMillan-Delaney, Sharon Tate, and
Janeen Yoshida.
1. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECrION, Nov 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996) [hereinafter CCRI]. The full
text reads as follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I
Section 31 is added to Article I of the California Constitution as follows:
SEC. 31. (a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat-
ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnic-
ity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's ef-
fective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide
qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any
court order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective date
of this section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action
which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal
[1135]
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cates argue that the CCRI embodies racial neutrality. They call for a
color-blind America, and they invoke the name of Martin Luther
King. The proponents of the CCRI loudly proclaim that it is they who
seek racial justice, and it is the defenders of affirmative action who are
reinforcing racial discrimination.' Race color blindness has been
presented as a progressive, forward-looking "vision" of racial justice.
program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to
the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not nec-
essarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county,
public university system, including the University of California, com-
munity college district, school district, special district, or any other
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the
state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the
same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin, as are otherwise available for violations of then-ex-
isting California antidiscrimination law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this sec-
tion are found to be in conflict with federal law or the United State
Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent
that federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provi-
sion held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this
section.
Id
2. These sentiments can be seen in almost every statement issued on behalf of the
CCRI. Exemplary are the introductory comments at the CCRI World Wide Web site. As
of this writing, the California Civil Rights Initiative maintains a Homepage on the World
'Wide Web at http://www.publicaffairsweb.com/ccriL. The introduction on the Homepage is
as follows:
Thanks for visiting CCRI's World Wide Web Site. The two of us have worked
together for four years on this issue. We are enlisting the help of as many people
as possible for the California Civil Rights Initiative. We hope you will join us in
supporting CCRI.
We are not politicians-one of us (Glynn) is a professor, and the other (Tom)
heads the California Association of Scholars. We spent months trying to get the
California State Legislature to put CCRI on the ballot for voters to decide, but
powerful Assembly leader Willie Brown used his political muscle to kill it.
Willie Brown left us with no other choice-we have to gather over 1 million
signatures to put our initiative on the ballot-with Brown fighting us all the way.
That's why we hope you will respond to the request from Governor Wilson you'll
find here at our site.
So, please join us in the fight to end racial and gender preferences and to
realize Dr. Martin Luther King's dream of a color-blind society. Thank you for
your support.
Sincerely,
Glynn Custred & Tom Wood
Co-authors California Civil Rights Initiative
This statement charges that Willie Brown, former speaker of the California Assembly,
left them "no other choice" but to go forward with the signature initiative process. Earlier
versions of the CCRI had been presented for legislative approval, but were never approved
in the California legislature's committees. Brown is African-American and a longtime ad-
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I believe that this is a total distortion of race color blindness. Far from
being a view to the future, race color blindness is a vision rooted in
nineteenth century conceptions of race. In its strong versions, race
color blindness is not only out of date and condemned to failure as a
program for racial justice, but race color blindness actively blocks ef-
forts to address conscientiously the multitude of issues surrounding
race.
This argument is in three parts. First, I will make a close techni-
cal examination of race color blindness, focusing on "racial nonrecog-
nition."3 This is the technique used to implement race color blindness
in the public sphere.4 We will then see how the technique of racial
nonrecognition has been transposed into the realm of private con-
duct-the private sphere. In this manner, I will demonstrate how de-
nying race in nongovernmental social interactions works to undermine
efforts to achieve social justice. The color-blind vision is exposed as a
vision of denial, instead of a truly open and just vision for the future
for America.
In the second section, I will look at the language of the recent
Fifth Circuit decision, Hopwood v. Texas.5 Sections of the majority
opinion will be examined as a text. I will review the court's language
as a narrative to see the implicit assumptions and understandings situ-
ated within the court's portrayal of the University of Texas School of
Law's admissions process. Special attention is paid to the meaning of
"diversity" in constitutional equal protection jurisprudence as estab-
lished by the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.' It is this conception of "diversity" which the
court aggressively rejected in Hopwood. From that analysis, I will ar-
gue that the Fifth Circuit panel has pursued an extremist approach to
the color-blind vision.
The third section takes a close and critical look at the language of
the California Civil Rights Initiative.7 I will show that the CCRI de-
bated in the media is not the same CCRI presented on the ballot. The
CCRI as written contains dramatic language which could radically al-
vocate for maintaining existing affirmative action programs, including minority set-asides
in public contracting, race-conscious college admissions, and minority outreach programs.
Brown is implicitly accused of fighting CCRI's efforts to "realize Dr. Martin Luther
King's dream of a color-blind society." AL
3. This analysis will draw upon my earlier work in Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our
Constitution is Colorblind, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
4. See id. at 68 n.77.
5. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. See supra note 1.
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ter California civil rights law and the structure of California education.
This analysis will demonstrate that, like the Hopwood decision, a
strong interpretation of the CCRI reveals an implementation of an
extreme interpretation of the color-blind vision.
Consider, first, constitutional color blindness and its racial vision.
II. What Is the Color-Blind Vision?
The color-blind social vision that I will describe is an interpreta-
tion derived from past Supreme Court decisions and our modem un-
derstanding of race. As part of that vision, I will suggest two models.
There is a "sensitive" version which leads to self-contradiction in ap-
plication. There is also an extreme or radical version which would
deny any validity to a racial experience.
The color-blind vision is often equated with the Supreme Court's
use of the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, while
they are related, they are not the same. The color-blind vision sweeps
much more broadly. The color-blind vision includes a decisionmaking
technique related to strict scrutiny which incorporates private as well
as governmental decisions. Even beyond such a technique, the color-
blind vision is presented as the articulation of the future American
society that we seek to build.
This broad and sweeping understanding of the color-blind vision
has never been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. In re-
cent cases, the Court has clarified its judicial review of governmental
use of race. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson & Co.' addressed state-
level government contracting; Shaw v. Reno9 dealt with voting rights;
and most recently, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,10 reviewed a
congressional enactment. In all of these cases, the Court adopted a
strict scrutiny standard of review.1' The Supreme Court addressed
these issues incrementally and with great caution. The Court is di-
vided, with a multitude of concurring and dissenting opinions.
The most significant limitation to the Court's consideration of is-
sues arising under equal protection has been the requirement of gov-
ermnent action. The presentation of color blindness as a social vision
or even as a moral imperative goes far beyond the constitutional doc-
8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
10. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
11. See, e.g., the discussion in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995).
trine of equal protection. Under modem equal protection doctrine, it
is only government action which is being reviewed.
For many important governmental rights and powers in the public
sphere, the use of strict scrutiny to review race-based decisionmaking
is intuitively attractive. If a court were to strike down a race-based
denial of the right to vote, there would be little dissent today. In these
situations, where granting an individual a right-for example, the
right to vote-does not involve the simultaneous decision to deny
someone else their right to vote, we could develop a strong consensus
that such a governmental racial restriction should be subject to strict
scrutiny. In these areas, the color-blind vision has its greatest power
and meaning. No one, on the basis of race, should be denied access to
the basic civil rights under law: the right to cast a ballot, defend one-
self in court, seek redress from the government.
In such open-ended governmental rights, we do not face our cur-
rent disagreements. At issue in most of the current debates about af-
firmative action are those decisions in which granting one party a
contract means denying the contract to someone else; where admis-
sion of one qualified student ultimately means denial of admission to
another qualified student; or where hiring one applicant means deny-
ing another applicant a job.
When invoked as a moral imperative, the color-blind vision as-
sumes that race color blindness is race-neutral as a process and em-
bodies a valid and positive racial social vision. I argue that this
assumption is not only false, but that race color blindness when ap-
plied to the complexities of civil society-to actual decisionmaking in
such areas as contracting, employment, and admissions-is not race-
neutral. Instead, it is a disguised form of racial privileging.
Consider the mechanics of using color blindness in an employ-
ment decision. Suppose an employer says, "Our last job applicant was
an African-American female, but I didn't take that into considera-
tion." For that statement to be coherent, several steps must be taken.
First, societal understandings of gender and race must already exist.
Then, at the job interview, that societal understanding must be applied
to the candidate. The candidate's gender and race are recognized as
applicable categories. Then, as part of the process, all femaleness and
blackness are eliminated from consideration.
Take careful note of the last step. Whatever our job interviewer
understood to be the significance of being female and African-Ameri-
can was discounted to zero and removed from consideration.
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Color blindness is often described as a race-neutral process.
However, "racial nonrecognition," the technique at the heart of our
understanding of color blindness, is by its nature not a "neutral" pro-
cess, since certain characteristics were recognized, calculated, and
then discounted.
The traditional sense of medical color blindness is instructive.
For those whose vision is not impaired, colors do exist. Colors can be
seen. By contrast, a medically color-blind person cannot see certain
"colors." For a majority-vision person to pretend t6 be color-blind, he
or she would first "see" the color, then pretend that the colors could
not be seen. It is the process of taking something that one knows to
exist-colors-and then consciously discounting their existence.
Returning to racial color blindness, any meanings that might at-
tach to being African-American, Asian, or Latina or Latino are all to
be ignored completely. Consider the life experiences that might be
attributed to being African-American. There are an infinite variety of
possibilities of such experiences, some of which have been captured in
stereotyped representations. No particular set of characteristics is
present for every African-American individual, and only a few may be
relevant to a particular decision. However, for this theory of color
blindness, the social value of any characteristic linked to race is re-
duced to zero. This process is under the sole and invisible control of
the decisionmaker. Even if such a decisionmaker is sensitive to the
complexities of race and even if he or she consciously attempts to dis-
count only "skin color" or racial identification in an effort at racial
neutrality, substantial complications remain.
Imagine a "sensitive" decisionmaker who feels that meeting the
challenges of adversity is a positive characteristic for an employee.
This decisionmaker would have to review our hypothetical African-
American female candidate, discount racial identifications and gen-
der, but still determine whether she has had to overcome the adversity
of racial discrimination without thinking about her race. If we allow
for unconscious stereotyping or prejudice, there is even greater room
for discounting on the basis of race.
Beyond the sensitive version, there is the strong version of race
color blindness. For the extreme version of race color blindness, all
race-related characteristics are to be discounted. There would be
none of the difficulties involved in assessing the merits of overcoming
individual racial adversity. Such individual experiences are race-re-
lated, and thus should not be considered. In short, in the extreme
version of racial non-recognition, the charge of "essentialism"-that
1140
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all members of a particular category will share certain characteris-
tics-is directly relevant. All of these assumed social considerations
of race are discounted to zero.
As a social vision-the color-blind vision-this extreme version
provides similar guidance. Since any racial understandings are dis-
counted as valueless, they are accorded little or no social merit. Such
notions as the historical or cultural contributions of race are dis-
carded. In the color-blind vision, all individuals are socially "de-
raced" or "de-racinated."
Anyone who faces the prospect of being "de-raced" under racial
nonrecognition has few positive choices. He or she might accept "de-
racing" and follow an assimilationist approach, seeking adaptation to
majority society. Yet, if the color-blind vision does not come to pass
and racial discrimination continues, such efforts will only end in frus-
tration. Alternatively, a person choosing not to assimilate would be
constitutionally condemned to a marginal existence in the future soci-
ety whenever racial recognition is applied. Instead of being a fully
human candidate, the target of nonrecognition in the color-blind vi-
sion enters decisionmaking with an automatic handicap.
As a social vision, race color blindness requires all individuals in
any decision of significance to predecide and to prejudge. As applied
to African-Americans, the vision of race color blindness suggests that
we will regard someone's identity as an African-American to be with-
out value or worth. The meanings of African-American identity
would be discounted to zero and any consideration of them would be
deemed illegitimate. If ethnicity-especially those ethnicities tradi-
tionally considered as non-white-is subsumed as racialized, the
color-blind vision applied to these ethnicities discounts their identities
as equally valueless to society.
1H. Hopwood v. Texas'
2
When I first wrote about constitutional color blindness several
years ago,'13 1 thought of the color-blind vision as an extreme extrapo-
lation of themes present in existing Supreme Court decisions. But
what I had projected as near-caricature has come into full view as the
majority opinion in Hopwood v. Texas.14 In that opinion, the discus-
sion which has attracted the most attention is the Fifth Circuit panel's
12. 78 F.3d at 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. See Gotanda, supra note 3.
14. 78 F.3d at 932.
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rejection of the Bakke 5 decision as precedent for the use of racial
diversity in the admissions process in higher education.
I would like to proceed by examining portions of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion as "text." I will look at the language of the majority
opinion for assumptions, categories, and hidden meanings. As a
methodology, this is similar to more traditional legal analysis using
analogy or precedent. Besides those more traditional methods, I am
looking for the relations and patterns of power and subordination-
especially those of race, gender, and economic power.
To explore the Hopwood opinion, let us look first at Justice Pow-
ell's lead opinion in the 1978 Bakke 6 decision. Though Powell wrote
only for himself and was not joined by another justice in that opinion,
Powell's understanding of the importance of "diversity" in higher edu-
cation emerged as the dominant constitutional understanding.
Powell's opinion lauded the "Harvard Plan," whereby race could
be one factor, with other admissions considerations, as a school sought
to select from among many qualified applicants. Under Powell's rea-
soning, the presence of at least a few racial minorities would add
"something" to the student body. As a result, total educational pro-
cess would be enhanced. Since the selection was to be made on a
racial basis, the Court's approach in Bakke acknowledged that there
was some recognizable social merit or value to being African-Ameri-
can or Latina or Latino.
Nationally, leading institutions of higher education have adopted
such race-conscious programs in admissions. Outside of education, the
importance of diversity has been embraced by corporate America. To
succeed in today's economy, a business must be lean and mean as well
as international and multicultural. Even if a company chooses not to
expand outside U.S. borders, employees and customers may well
speak English as a second language. Sensitivity to racial and cultural
diversity is simply a part of the domestic and world market.
Even with this level of acceptance, one can still adopt a critical
viewpoint and note that diversity programs are minimal programs.
The goal of diversity programs in higher education is quality educa-
tion for the entire student body. Since racial minorities are, by defini-
tion, a minority of the student body, diversity seeks the admission of
the minimum number of racial minorities whose contribution will re-
sult in a quality education for the majority. Restated in Hopwood's
black-white terms: Diversity seeks to admit the smallest number of
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
16. Id.
African-American students needed to educate properly the white
students.
17
As an affirmative action program, the goal of diversity is much
reduced from those of such measures as Executive Order 11,246.18
That executive order and related government programs sought minor-
ity workforce participation that matched some larger reference target,
such as the percentage of minorities in the population, or the number
of qualified minorities in a defined employment market. Those goals
and timetables were far more ambitious goals than that which is con-
templated by a diversity program.
Returning to the language of the Hopwood decision, we can
quickly see that even such a limited notion as academic racial diversity
was unacceptable to the Hopwood court. Consider the following
language:
Within the general principles of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education
contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection.
Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes, the use of race. It
treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It may
further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote im-
proper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility.' 9
The court's use of "remedial" rather than educational purposes, is re-
vealing. The court chose not to recognize that racial diversity has any
educational merit. Stated positively, the court essentially found that
the African-American experience has nothing to contribute to educa-
tion. This is not an overstated interpretation. The court went on to
say:
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is
no more rational on its own terms than would be choices based
upon the physical size or blood type of applicants. Thus, the
Supreme Court has long held that governmental actors cannot
justify their decisions solely because of race. See, e.g., Croson,
488 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opin-
ion of Powell, J.).20
In this paragraph, the court is saying that it is irrational to consider
race as having any social value, and that racial diversity is attributable
17. There is no discussion of race or ethnicity beyond black and white. The panel
either ignored or failed to conceive of the possibility of complications arising outside of the
black-white racial paradigm. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
19. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 (emphasis added).
20. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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only to "looks" or other arbitrary physical characteristics. "Accord-
ingly, we see the caselaw as sufficiently established that the use of
ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of
the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional."'"
Again, racial diversity for the Hopwood court is not a question of con-
tributions to the social mix of higher education, but one of "heteroge-
neity"-a collection of difference without meaning or purpose.
The use of "ethnic diversity" leading to "racial heterogeneity" is
confusing if one is trying to distinguish ethnicity from race. The Hop-
wood majority seems to have given little thought to that distinction
and uses ethnicity and race synonymously, subsuming ethnicity into
race. The suggestion that this usage makes all "ethnic" diversity im-
permissible is never discussed by the court.
The court also articulates a racial vision for the Fourteenth
Amendment. According to the Hopwood court, the Equal Protection
Clause carries no vision of racial fairness or racial justice for society; it
is only a prohibition upon governmental use of race. Thus, the court
continues to emphasize:
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "is to pre-
vent the States from purposefully discriminating between indi-
viduals on the basis of race." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). It seeks
ultimately to render the issue of race irrelevant in governmental
decisionmaking. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)
("A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away
with all governmentally imposed discrimination.") 2"
There is a prohibition only upon the states, and no suggestion at
all of any promise for a better racial future. If there are problems of
race in civil society, they must be secondary to the demand that gov-
ernment not soil its hands in those disputes. Issues of racial injustice?
According to this court, the Equal Protection Clause simply does not
care about such questions.
The Hopwood court thus embodies both a weak and strong moral
response to both the sensitive and extreme versions of the "color-
blind vision." The weak response is the one just described: On issues
of racial injustice, "We don't care." The strong moral response is the
one that corresponds to the extreme color-blind vision. Is there any
socially redeeming value to being African-American, Asian, Latina, or
Latino? No, there is no social merit worth considering, and therefore
21. it. at 945-46 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 939-40 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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a diversity program is only a remedial program under an irrational
disguise.
With a social focus, the Hopwood court sees education as a
unicultural, nonracial enterprise. It sees no place in education for rec-
ognition of racial diversity. Such recognition would thus be irrational
and violate the basic tenets of the Equal Protection Clause.
IV. California Civil Rights Initiative
One of the peculiar aspects of the debate over the California Civil
Rights Initiative 3 has been the large gap between the CCRI as writ-
ten and the issues under discussion. To date, most of the attention has
been focused upon public contracting, public employment, and college
admissions. Yet the language of the CCRI goes far beyond those ar-
eas. Consider the text of subdivision (a) of the CCRI:
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting.24
In this form, there are several distinct areas in which the CCRI di-
verges substantially from existing California civil rights laws.
First, to the traditional prohibition "shall not discriminate
against," there is added the phrase "grant preferential treatment."
This suggests the evolution of a new cause of action: "preferential
treatment." The change emphasizes that in affirmative action pro-
grams, someone else has been granted a benefit, not that another indi-
vidual was denied some right or privilege. Thus, a women's center, or
an Hispanic theme dormitory, would be viewed as granting preferen-
tial treatment, regardless of whether anyone else has been denied a
right or benefit.
Next, the protections extend not just to individuals but to
"groups." This adds two possibilities. The harm could be extended
from the individual to an entire group, giving rise to individuals' as
well as groups' claims for harm. The second possibility arises out of
allegations of preferences given a group without any proof of harm.
This type of activity would still violate the law as set out in the CCRI.
Consider, then, whether a state college or public library celebration of
African-American History Month would thus violate the CCRI.
The CCRI adds "ethnicity" to the more traditional laws proscrib-
ing race, sex, color, and national origin. While this follows in the anti-
23. See supra note 1.
24. See supra note 1.
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discrimination tradition, the addition of "preferential treatment"
would make any benefit to an "ethnic group"-for example, Italians
on Columbus Day-a violation of the CCRI.
The CCRI is not limited to public employment and public con-
tracting but extends to "public education." Further, the CCRI is not
limited to admissions and employment, but covers "the operation" of
education. This may include the entire range of functional education,
including administration, funding, admissions, programs, outreach,
and employment.
To appreciate the significance of some of these differences, con-
sider first the question of racially targeted outreach programs. Advo-
cates of the CCRI have vigorously argued that outreach programs will
not be affected. For example, William A. Rusher argued in the San
Diego Union-Tribune:
Moreover, the ad. described CCRI as an "initiative designed to
eliminate affirmative action," which is a blatant lie. The initia-
tive has no effect whatever on such desirable aspects of affirma-
tive action as outreach and job training.'
Similarly, Eugene Volokh of UCLA Law School has stated:
Current law lets government discriminate in favor of some peo-
ple based on their race or sex, to the disadvantage of others who
aren't eligible for such preferences .... The CCRI would effec-
tively prohibit these, while leaving intact outreach and other
nonpreferential forms of affirmative action.26
I am mystified by these assertions. An outreach program that
spends money to recruit students from a particular racial or ethnic
community, or an apprenticeship program that prepares citizens of a
particular community for entry into the job market, both clearly fall
within the plain language of the prohibitions of the CCRI. Volokh
and Rusher both argue that the CCRI is essentially limited to admis-
sions and employment. But it is not-it applies quite broadly to "the
operation of public employment and public education. '27
To further explore the language of the CCRI, let us examine the
results of one extreme interpretation, using as an example the teach-
ing of high school French. Under the CCRI, what would be the out-
come of a challenge to such instruction if another group-Vietnamese
25. William A. Rusher, Using Women in Civil Rights Fight, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRal.,
May 23, 1996, at B10.
26. Sally Pipes and Eugene Volokh, Women Need Not Fear the Civil Rights Initiative;
CCRI Its Language Strengthens Rather Than Weakens Laws Against Sex Discrimination,
LA TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at B9.
27. See supra note 1 (emphasis added).
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students, for example-sought to have "their" language taught in
school. In interpreting this problem under the "new" CCRI provi-
sions, the ruling body might well regard teaching French classified as
an ethnicity or a national origin as preferential treatment of a group.
To distinguish French in this case, it would be necessary to invent
some legal distinction which would exclude French from "preferential
treatment" or "group" or "operation of public education." Unfortu-
nately, while the desired outcome is clear-the continuation of teach-
ing French-the method of achieving this goal is by no means simple.
Under traditional civil rights law, I could not have made this
claim, because only individuals who are in fact harmed can raise a
claim of discrimination. Thus, if I argued that I am Vietnamese and
that I am not being allowed to study Vietnamese, the response would
be that I am completely free to take the French course. It is open to
all. The new language of the CCRI, however, makes "preferential
treatment to a group" the basis for a claim. And it seems to follow
logically that teaching someone's own ethnic language is a benefit to
that particular ethnic group.
Even if one moves away from the teaching of a "foreign" lan-
guage, consider academic programs such as Ethnic Studies or African-
American Studies. In Ethnic Studies, it is not a language but an
ethnicity itself which is being studied and taught. Even more broadly,
if we consider "national origin," American Studies (American is a
national origin) could arguably be covered by CCRI prohibitions.
Even if one developed some distinction between "administra-
tion" and "content" of public education, difficulties would still arise in
such things as museum programs. Several years ago, UCLA's Fowler
Museum presented a program called "Irangeles: Iranians in Los An-
geles." Under the CCRI such a program would be considered prefer-
ential to an ethnic group. Even if the program were not prohibited,
the ability of the Museum to do outreach or fund-raising within the
Iranian community would arguably be curtailed by provisions of the
CCRI under "administration."
Finally, even if one posits a theory that argues "operation of' in-
cludes administration and excludes course content, problems still arise
with college admissions and diversity programs. Both the Bakke and
Hopwood courts clearly believed that the selection of students was a
significant part of the educational process. Thus, admissions is di-
rectly related to the content of university education. Using this hypo-
thetical content-administration rule, it then would follow that if the
student admissions procedure is related to the content of public edu-
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cation, student admissions would then be excluded from coverage of
the CCRI. This would put us in the odd position of saying that state
public education outside of the U.C. system could operate racial di-
versity programs.
Alternatively, if student admissions is labeled "administration"
and not "content" and thereby governed under the CCRI, the applica-
tion of this distinction to educational programs creates further difficul-
ties. For example, if course content were exempt from the CCRI, the
"selection" of courses would be analogous to the admission of stu-
dents. In our first example of the Vietnamese who petitioned for
Vietnamese instead of French class, the choice of French over
Vietnamese would be covered, even if the content of the course was
itself exempt.
These problems, however, might be seen as part of the difficulty
of working on a controversial issue in a committee setting. However,
I would argue that these problems are not accidental; rather, they re-
flect some of the same considerations I articulated as part of the color-
blind vision.
How can CCRI advocates assert distinctions which are plainly not
in the written initiative? I suggest that this gap between the text of
the CCRI and its advocates can be seen as the gap between the ex-
treme and sensitive color-blind visions. Under the extreme color-
blind vision, racial minorities as such have nothing to contribute to
education. The loss of racial or ethnic centers or outreach programs
to ethnic communities would be of minimal concern if such minorities
had nothing to contribute to American society.
Similarly, a narrow understanding of the new categories contrib-
utes to the failure to recognize the problems caused by adding ethnic-
ity, groups, and preferential treatment to the CCRI. Ethnicity and
national origin are seen as simply substitutes for race. As such, they
have no independent validity. Thus, the plain language of the CCRI
implements this extreme color-blind vision.
In contrast, the authors of the CCRI argue that they wish to
maintain outreach programs which will help to build a better society.
They advocate a "sensitive" color-blind version of the CCRI, yet must
hurdle the plain language of the CCRI. The implementation of such a
"sensitive" version of the CCRI encounters numerous textual difficul-
ties. It is difficult to maintain the "sensitive" interpretation given the
internal contradictions of the color-blind vision added to the contra-
dictions in the actual language of the CCRI. The plain language
wholly discounts and eliminates any consideration of race or ethnicity
in the operation of public education, employment, and contracting.
There are no textual limitations here.
The vision embedded in the actual language of the CCRI, with its
call for the elimination of all considerations of race, ethnicity, and na-
tional origin, embodies the most extreme interpretation of the color-
blind vision. It calls for a society in which only an invisible majority
will have a place in California government, education, and public life.
V. Conclusion-The Bankruptcy of Color Blindness
The Hopwood decision and the California Civil Rights Initiative
are informed by similar color-blind visions-a uniform American cul-
ture, in which the culture of racial minorities and nonwhite ethnicities
are peripheral to mainstream life. Far beyond any other recent legal
decisions or enactments, the CCRI and the Hopwood decision em-
body this extremist version of the color-blind vision.
I believe that this vision of race color blindness fails on all counts
as a moral prescriptive for racial justice. As illustrated by the Hop-
wood opinion, advocacy of race color blindness requires blatant ma-
nipulation to establish its political objectives. The Hopwood court
chose to ignore history, manipulate doctrine, ride roughshod over pre-
cedent, and, as applied specifically to education, ignore obvious social
issues.
This year-1996-is the centennial year of Plessy v. Ferguson.28
It was one hundred years ago that Justice Harlan, dissenting, articu-
lated his "color-blind" vision. As a statement of social policy at the
turn of the century, Harlan presented a position on race preferable to
the majority's embrace of segregation.29 But his position was positive
only against the standards of the nineteenth century. We should keep
in mind the full context of Harlan's racial position. He was not argu-
ing for racial social equality. To the contrary, Harlan was confident in
the continuance of white dominance in American society.
Consider the text of the entire paragraph containing Harlan's fa-
mous language:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this coun-
try. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitu-
tion, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. l i
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dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most pow-
erful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarant[eed]
by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is therefore to
be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the
fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusions that it
is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of
their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.3"
His position was far from a belief in what we would today con-
sider racial justice. He was arguing that the white race was clearly
superior to the black race in civil society-in private, social rela-
tions-and did not need the government support of Jim Crow segre-
gation laws to maintain white racial hegemony.
Harlan was not calling for a vision of America where all Ameri-
cans will find fairness and social justice. Instead, he was confident of
the continued maintenance of the dominant position of "the white
race ... in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power."'3 1 He was content to allow racial privilege to continue, so
long as basic civil rights were maintained on a nonracial basis. Justice
Harlan's vision of racial justice is hardly consistent with our modern
understandings of racial justice. And Harlan's vision is literally a cen-
tury removed from the content and tone of Dr. Martin Luther King's
vision in his famous "I Have a Dream" speech.32
Today, the call to return to Harlan's vision of racial color blind-
ness is set in a vastly altered America. The pressing political and so-
cial issues of racial division turn on whether to continue and maintain
white privileges in civil society. At issue is whether America will ful-
fill its promise to become a truly open society. Nothing less than the
future of our democratic ideals is at stake. We must strive for an
America which goes beyond Harlan's restricted vision of equality in
the formal avenues of government. We should seek honest multiracial
and multicultural openness in the full fabric of our society-not only
government-but also interpersonal and private relations between
and among all Americans.
It is deeply illogical and counterintuitive that the Hopwood court
and the CCRI should pose race color blindness as both program and
30. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Ellen Warren, Thirty Years Ago; "I Have a Dream" King's Famous Words Almost
Weren't Spoken, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 27, 1993, at Al.
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moral vision for racial justice. As a program-as a means to address
America's racial divisions-the color-blind vision seeks to solve a
problem by forbidding us from talking about the problem. It seems
trivial to restate the obvious, but if racial divisions are an American
problem, then they deserve to be addressed by our governments. And
if we prevent our own governments from taking race into account-
whether through constitutional prohibition or through state enact-
ments-we tie our own hands and prevent any genuine attempt to
address these issues.
As a moral vision, the invocation of color blindness at the end of
the twentieth century should be seen for what it truly is-a reaction-
ary call to return to the race relations of the nineteenth century. Our
responsibility is to -look forward-to the twenty-first century-an era
when border and boundaries, cultures and races, will mix and inter-
penetrate on a global scale at a velocity which is unmatched in human
history. Nostalgia is entertaining, but looking backwards for political
guidance can be dangerous. It is time that we move forward, of neces-
sity, through our legal system. Our laws and our courts, through their
cumbersome institutions of precedent and procedure, will impose
upon us needed caution as we negotiate these difficult and highly
charged issues. Yet we must go forward not backwards. That is our
obligation and our duty.

